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Abstract 
To reduce global biodiversity loss, there is an urgent need to determine the most 
efficient allocation of conservation resources. Recently, there has been a growing trend 
for many governments to supplement public ownership and management of reserves 
with incentive programs for conservation on private land. At the same time, policies to 
promote conservation on private land are rarely evaluated in terms of their ecological 
consequences. This raises important questions, such as the extent to which private land 
conservation can improve conservation outcomes, and how it should be mixed with 
more traditional public land conservation. We address these questions, using a general 
framework for modelling environmental policies and a case study examining the 
conservation of endangered native grasslands to the west of Melbourne, Australia. 
Specifically, we examine three policies that involve: i) spending all resources on 
creating public conservation areas; ii) spending all resources on an ongoing incentive 
program where private landholders are paid to manage vegetation on their property with 
5-year contracts; and iii) splitting resources between these two approaches. The 
performance of each strategy is quantified with a vegetation condition change model 
that predicts future changes in grassland quality. Of the policies tested, no one policy 
was always best and policy performance depended on the objectives of those enacting 
the policy. This work demonstrates a general method for evaluating environmental 
policies and highlights the utility of a model which combines ecological and 
socioeconomic processes. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Globally, there has been an increasing loss of biodiversity and habitat due 
predominantly to anthropogenic land-use change (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 
2005). To ensure a sustainable future, there is an urgent need to determine the most 
efficient allocation of resources for conserving biodiversity (Wu and Boggess, 1999). 
This is a complex task, as determining the most effective conservation actions or 
policies for a given region involves balancing ecological, financial, and social 
constraints. 
 
Conservation actions that target biodiversity on private land can act as vital 
supplements to conservation that targets public land, and private land conservation is 
increasingly recognized as being strategically important (Figgis, 2004; Knight, 1999; 
Newburn et al., 2005). Both in Australia and internationally, there are areas where a 
significant proportion of native and/or ecologically important vegetation occurs on 
private land (Drechsler et al., 2007; Figgis, 2004; Knight, 1999).  This has led 
government agencies around the world to explore a range of mechanisms for promoting 
conservation on private land, such as fixed price grants, tax incentives or voluntary 
schemes (Doremus, 2003; European Commission, 2005; Main et al., 1999; USDA, 
2010). More recently in Australia, conservation contracts have been auctioned within 
the BushTender scheme run by the Victorian Government’s Department of 
Sustainability and Environment (DSE) (Stoneham et al., 2003; DSE, 2008a). Delivering 
such a scheme involves consulting with the landholders in a given area and having them 
offer a price (bid) for undertaking conservation actions on their property over a fixed 
time. Participation is voluntary and the agency is then able to choose which bids to 
accept or reject. Schemes such as these have the potential to deliver conservation 
outcomes in a more cost effective manner than other fixed-price methods of private land 
conservation (Stoneham et al., 2003). 
 
Although policies to promote conservation on private land have been implemented in 
numerous countries, they are rarely evaluated in terms of their ecological consequences 
(although there are exceptions, e.g. Natural England (2009)). This means that policy 
choices are often made in a non-transparent manner based on some mix of conjecture 
and expert opinion, rather than on evidence. Here, we present an illustrative example 
and a method for assessing the consequences of conservation policies that incorporates 
both ecological and socioeconomic processes, and allows policy outcomes to be 
evaluated based on clear and transparent assumptions.  
 
Specifically, we focus on an example comparing the outcomes of private land 
conservation schemes that involve short-term conservation contracts (such as 
BushTender) to the outcomes of more traditional methods such as purchasing land to 
establish public conservation areas. Although the analysis presented here models one 
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specific type of private land conservation in an Australian context, the modelling 
approach used is general. It could be adapted to other contexts that involve the 
allocation of conservation resources among a group of stakeholders, with ensuing 
biodiversity gains or losses. A re-parameterisation of the model components with 
empirical data and/or expert opinion would allow its application to other locations (e.g., 
European agri-environmental schemes or US Landowner Incentive Programs) or to 
additional private conservation alternatives such as easements or covenants. 
 
We demonstrate our approach with a case study examining the conservation of the 
Western (Basalt) Plains Natural Temperate Grassland (henceforth called native 
grassland) to the west of Melbourne, Australia. This native grassland is one of 
Australia’s most endangered vegetation types with over 99.5% of its original 
distribution having been lost or substantially altered (Williams et al., 2005). It supports 
a diversity of animal species (DSE, 2004), including eight nationally threatened species. 
The remaining remnants predominantly occur on private land (DNRE, 1997) and 
continue to face a number of threats including inappropriate grazing or fire regimes, 
weed invasion, inappropriate herbicide use and the application of fertilizers (DSE, 2004; 
Carter et al., 2003). Thus it is thought that most native grassland on private land will 
have a deterministic decline in condition if left unmanaged (Williams et al., 2006). 
Further background on the ecology and history of these native grasslands are provided 
in the Supplementary information. 
 
In our case study, we explore the situation where a fixed budget is available every 5 
years that can either be spent completely on public conservation (involving land 
purchase and managing existing reserves), private land conservation (BushTender type 
conservation contracts) or an equal mix of both. We examine how each of these 
strategies performs, relative to a scenario with no intervention. We also examine how 
the policies perform in the presence of development, which is assumed to destroy native 
grassland. The performance of each strategy is quantified with a grassland condition 
model that predicts how the vegetation quality of grassland changes with time 
depending on its current condition and the management status of the vegetation. 
 
<< Fig. 1 >> 
 
2  Methods 
We used a previously-developed general modelling framework to simulate the 
ecological and socioeconomic processes involved with each conservation policy 
(Langford et al. 2009).  The framework consists of the following 6 steps: 1) define study 
area, 2) define planning units and habitat information, 3) define costs and budgets, 4) 
undertake conservation actions, 5) model system dynamics, and 6) measure 
consequences. Below we describe how each step relates to the present analysis. More 
details on the modelling framework can be found in Langford et al. (2009). 
 
2.1 Define study area 
The study area is located near Melbourne, Australia (Fig. 1).  It borders the western 
growth boundary of Melbourne and is predominantly agricultural land, but also contains 
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regions of urban and industrial land-use. The study area was chosen because it is an area 
where the Victorian Government plans to purchase land for public conservation to offset 
the loss of native grassland from the proposed expansion of Melbourne (DPCD, 2009). 
Together with DSE, we were interested in developing models to understand how private 
land conservation policies might supplement public land conservation in this area. 
 
2.2 Define planning units and habitat information 
Habitat information was obtained from a map depicting the condition of the Western 
(Basalt) Plains Natural Temperate Grassland community (Fig. 1). The map was derived 
from a modelled vegetation condition layer for the state of Victoria (GIS layer 
NV2005_QUAL1; DSE, 2009a) and site data collected during 2008-2009 by the 
Victorian Growth Areas Authority and DSE. The modelled vegetation condition layer 
was generated from site measurements of vegetation composition and structure in 
conjunction with coincident environmental data to build an extensive spatially explicit 
model of vegetation condition across the state of Victoria (Kocev et al., 2009; Newell et 
al., 2006). Each cell represents the condition of grassland as measured by the habitat 
hectares vegetation assessment method (Parkes et al., 2003).  This score represents 
vegetation condition relative to a mature and undisturbed benchmark of the same 
vegetation type. Habitat hectares scores range between 0 and 100, and include a site 
condition component (75%) and a landscape context component (25%). For this 
analysis, only the site condition component of the score was used and the grassland 
condition map was divided by 100 producing condition scores ranging between 0.0 and 
0.75 (Fig. 1). 
 
The planning units define the discrete elements upon which policies can act. They 
consist of properties derived from Victoria’s Cadastral Area Boundary layer (DSE, 
2009a). Properties with an area less than 5 hectares were excluded from the study, as 
these properties are primarily residential and contain small amounts of lower quality 
grassland (parcels greater than 5 hectares contain 93% of the native grassland in the 
study area, and 95% of the higher quality grassland; see Supplementary information for 
more details). This resulted in 3302 properties with a median size of 13.3 hectares, a 
mean size of 33.7 hectares and a standard deviation of 102 hectares.  
 
All data was converted to raster format with a 50 
! 
"  50 m2 pixel resolution. This 
resolution was chosen so that grassland condition variation could be clearly resolved in 
the smallest land parcels. 
 
2.3 Define costs and budgets 
The purchase price of a parcel was generated by first obtaining a price per hectare, 
and then using this value to calculate the full parcel price. The price per hectare was 
determined by sampling from a lognormal distribution based on real sale price data 
from the study area and surrounds. As larger parcels tend to have a lower price per 
hectare, we split the real price data into two samples, depending on whether the parcel 
area was less than or greater than 150 hectares, and then fitted a lognormal distribution 
to each sample. The parcel price per hectare in the model was then determined by 
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achieve a realistic variation in the sale prices of the parcels being modelled, as well as 
capturing some of the correlation between sale price per hectare and parcel area (see 
Supplementary Information for further details). 
 
Management costs were based on the known costs of managing similar grassland in 
other areas of the state and were given a fixed value per hectare. In a BushTender trial in 
the Victorian Riverina Bioregion, management costs paid to land holders with 
properties containing Northern Plains Grassland were similar to the cost of ongoing 
management of existing conservation reserves in the area (DSE, unpublished data). 
Using this information as a guide to realistic management cost ranges, we explored 
scenarios with two different management costs for a 5-year time period for both public 
and private conservation: low ($100 per hectare) and high ($300 per hectare).  
 
At each time-step a fixed budget was allocated to the policy being undertaken. Three 
budgets were used to investigate the impact of budget size on policy ranking: small ($1 
M), medium ($1.5 M) and large ($2 M). These values were used to reflect plausible 
budgets for both public and private land conservation. Previous BushTender trials have 
had a budget of over $0.9 M (DSE, 2009b) and a $2 M budget per 5 years is realistic for 
public conservation on the western edge of Melbourne, considering that $50 M was 
spent on land acquisition for extending the parkland network throughout all of 
metropolitan Melbourne between 2005 - 2008 (DSE, 2008b). 
 
2.4 Undertake conservation actions 
Simulations were run for 80 years, with 16 time-steps, each of five years duration. 
These settings were chosen to allow the long-term consequences of policies to play out 
over time, with a temporal resolution set to the length of a private conservation contract. 
At each time-step, a policy was followed until the budget was exhausted. Each policy 
was run 5 times with a different random seed, to explore the extent to which model 
stochasticity caused results to vary. 
 
We examined four policies for undertaking conservation actions, covering the 
extremes and midpoint of how budgets could be split between policies: 
 
i) Conservation on private land only - Undertake conservation by paying a random 
subset of landholders for a 5-year (single time-step) contract to manage the native 
grassland on their land. Once the contract expires, the landholder is eligible to enter into 
a new contract. This policy models a voluntary program that is dependant on willing 
landholders choosing to participate. The random selection of landholders simulates the 
likelihood that participation will not be related to the quality or quantity of grassland on 
their parcel (see section 4.3 for further discussion of this point).  
 
ii) Conservation of public land only - First pay to manage existing public reserves for 
the next time-step (if any), and then spend the remaining budget on purchasing and 
managing new land parcels. With this strategy, a point may be reached where the entire 
budget will be spent managing existing reserves. As an agency would attempt to be 
strategic in purchasing land for conservation, we used the following greedy heuristic for 
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ranking and selecting available parcels. First, land parcels with a mean condition score 
greater than the grassland condition threshold (see below) are ranked by their 
benefit/cost score, calculated by summing the condition score of all grassland pixels in 
the parcel and dividing it by the purchase cost. Parcels are then purchased and managed 
in order until the budget is exhausted, or until no parcels above the threshold remain. If 
budget remains, the same procedure is applied to parcels below the condition threshold. 
 
iii) Mixed strategy - The budget is split equally between undertaking conservation on 
private and public land. For each portion of the budget, the relevant 
purchase/management strategies above are followed. 
 
iv) Do nothing - There are no conservation interventions in the system. 
2.5 Model system dynamics 
To estimate the effects of conservation actions, we used a model describing how the 
condition of native grassland changes depending on its management status. All 
grassland is assumed to be in one of three categories: managed, unmanaged, or 
developed.  Land is considered to be managed when it is within a public reserve or 
private land incentive program.  Unmanaged land is grassland on private land subject to 
entitled uses (such as grazing) and uncontrolled threats (such as perennial weed 
invasion). Developed land is assumed to no longer support viable native grassland, due 
to urban development. 
 
Future grassland condition was calculated at the per-pixel level. At each time-step 
the condition of grassland was updated using the curves shown in Fig. 2. These curves 
reflect behaviour specific to the grasslands in this study and were parameterised using 
the expert opinion of DSE ecologists.  Unmanaged grasslands were assumed to degrade 
over time, while managed grasslands were assumed to improve in quality.  However, 
once a patch of grassland falls below a certain condition threshold, it is difficult to fully 
restore it, so there are two different condition curves for managed land. The most likely 
value of the threshold was estimated at 0.35, based on DSE expert opinion. The two 
solid curves in Fig. 2 show how the condition of a pixel of managed grassland will 
change over time depending on its initial condition: if it starts with a condition score 
above/below 0.35, it will asymptote towards a value of 0.75/0.35, respectively.  
 
To model stochasticity of the condition change process, the condition score of each 
pixel was perturbed by adding a small random value sampled from a normal distribution 
with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 0.02 (based on DSE expert opinion). A 
small proportion of pixels were allowed to cross the threshold due to these random 
fluctuations and embark on the higher recoverability curve. The probability of this 
occurring was 0.0005, based on the expert opinion of DSE ecologists. 
 
As we were interested in investigating how policy performance varied in the 
presence of adversity, scenarios were run with development that is assumed to destroy 
vegetation. In these scenarios, 207 randomly selected parcels were developed at each 
time-step. We chose this development rate so that all unprotected parcels would be 
developed during the 80-year period of the simulation. Parcels were selected randomly 
because there is currently little information on likely development patterns over the next 
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80 years and much of the area has homogenous (rural) land-use zonings. 
<< Fig. 2 >> 
2.6 Measure consequences 
This final step quantifies the consequences of the modelled actions by summarising 
the output of the grassland condition change model. Two metrics were used to obtain 
aggregate scores of grassland condition at each time-step: (i) the total summed condition 
(TSC), calculated by summing the condition value of all pixels of grassland in the study 
area; (ii) the summed condition above threshold (CAT), obtained by summing the 
values of each pixel of grassland in the study area with a condition score higher than the 
0.35 threshold (see section 2.5). These metrics were chosen to give insight into how 
given conservation policies affect the extent and condition of native grassland in the 
study area. The CAT metric provides an indication of the extent and quality of grassland 
that has the potential to reach a high condition score.  
 
3 Results 
The four policies under investigation were: (i) spend the entire budget on public 
conservation (ii) spend the entire budget on private conservation, (iii) split the budget 
equally between the two in a mixed strategy, or (iv) do nothing. 
 
Figs. 3 – 5 show how aggregate measures of native grassland extent and condition 
vary with time using the small and large budgets. In Figs. 3 – 5 the left column shows 
the total summed condition (TSC) of all grassland in the study area on the y-axis while 
the right column shows the summed condition above the 0.35 threshold (CAT). Results 
are shown for low management cost in Figs. 3 and 4 and for high management cost in 
Fig. 5. The median condition value of each policy is shown as a solid or dashed line, 
and the grey band depicts the range of trajectories for that policy over the five 
realisations of the simulation.  In some situations there is considerable overlap between 
bands. 
   
The results with no development are shown in Fig. 3. When evaluating the policies 
using TSC and the small budget, private conservation performs best, followed closely 
(in the long term) by the mixed strategy and then public conservation (Fig. 3a). The 
difference in performance between the three strategies is exaggerated when the budget 
is increased (Fig. 3c). However, if the higher quality grassland is used to evaluate the 
policies (using the CAT metric), there is a crossover point where public conservation 
overtakes the private and mixed strategies (Fig. 3b, 3d).  For the small budget, this 
crossover point occurs at approximately 32 years. For the large budget, the private 
conservation policy still has a greater score at the end of the 80-year simulation, but 
eventually falls below public conservation if the simulation time is increased. In both 
CAT-evaluated plots the mixed policy has considerable overlap with the public 
conservation policy, with a median condition score only slightly below public 
conservation at the end of the simulation. In all cases the mixed budget also yields a 
higher condition score for the first 25 years compared to public conservation. 
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<< Fig. 3 >>  
 
Policy performance was also explored in the presence of development (Fig. 4), to 
gauge the robustness of policies to this particular type of adversity. The additional 
stochasticity from the development model increases the performance variability of all 
policies under all budgets, denoted by the thickening of all the grey bands in Fig. 4. 
Evaluating the policies with the CAT metric (Fig. 4b, 4d) shows only a small change 
compared to the case without background development (Fig 3b, 3d). The main 
difference is in the performance of private conservation with the larger budget (Fig. 4c 
and d), where performance drops off more rapidly towards the end of the simulation, 
compared to the case without development. When TSC is used to evaluate the policies, 
development has a larger impact (Fig. 4a, 4c) resulting in highly degraded performance 
for all policies. The policies tend to have a greater overlap in performance, especially 
where the budget is small (Fig. 4a). A change in ranking also occurs relative to the case 
without development, where public conservation overtakes both the private and mixed 
policies after approximately 60 years (Fig. 4a, 4c). 
 
<< Fig. 4 >>  
 
We also explored the consequences of increasing the management cost per 5-year 
period to the higher value of $300 per hectare (Fig. 5). This threefold increase in 
management outlay has a significant influence, with all policies suffering differing 
reductions in performance. Public conservation, where land purchase dominates the 
budget, only suffers a small reduction in performance. In comparison, private 
conservation suffers the largest reduction as the whole budget is spent on land 
management, while the mixed policy suffers an intermediate reduction. With increased 
management cost, both the mixed and private conservation policies end up falling below 
the public policy for all budgets and evaluation criteria (Fig. 5).  
 
<< Fig. 5 >>  
 
The results in Figs. 3 – 5 were also run with the medium budget of $1.5 M and these 
results are shown in the Supplementary information (Figs. S3 and S4), along with the 
small and large budget results for reference. The medium budget results are consistent 
with a transition between the small and large budgets. 
 
4 Discussion 
Deciding how to allocate limited conservation budgets across a range of actions can 
be challenging. Predicting the consequences of any given allocation strategy can be 
equally difficult. The study discussed here demonstrates a process for exploring the 
consequences of allocating a fixed budget between different policies involving 
conservation on both public and private land. This process combines a method for 
implementing a complex sequence of actions with a system model that simulates the 
response of the landscape to those actions.  
 
In presenting this case study we aimed to demonstrate the feasibility and utility of a 
complex sequential model for examining policy performance and robustness to a range 
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of scenarios and future adversities. Each sub-component of our model has the potential 
for increased realism and complexity, or could be altered to model other policies, 
locations or vegetation types. The design of the modelling framework we used is 
modular for this very reason (Langford et al., 2009). Later in the discussion we consider 
some further assumptions in our model, and ways of incorporating added complexity 
and realism. One of our goals in presenting this study is to demonstrate the feasibility 
and usefulness of one such method, with the hope of encouraging the increased use of 
evaluation and evidence in the development of conservation policy. 
 
4.1 Impact of policy objectives 
Comparing policies inherently depends on the objectives of those who are enacting 
policy. The results in Figs. 3 – 5 show that there are tradeoffs between policies 
depending on budget, management costs, time horizon and how quality and future 
persistence of grassland is valued, relative to the gross quantity of grassland.  
 
The private conservation strategy resulted in a larger area of grassland being 
managed at any given time because there were no land acquisition costs. However, the 
area being managed changes as contracts expire and new ones are initiated, so a given 
parcel may potentially move in and out of management several times throughout the 
simulation. The amount of time that a parcel is left unmanaged, with a resulting 
decrease in grassland condition, depends on the proportion of the landscape being 
managed at any given time-step, which in turn depends on the budget and available area 
of grassland. If only a small proportion of the landscape can be managed at any time, 
parcels are likely to spend little time in management and to fall below the condition 
threshold (Fig. 3b, line 2). This reduces the effectiveness of future management, since 
once grassland falls below the condition threshold, it is likely to remain in poor 
condition regardless of the frequency or expense of subsequent management. 
 
Public conservation takes the opposite approach where land is purchased and 
retained and these parcels stay managed throughout the simulation. This strategy 
provides a smaller, but steadily increasing amount of grassland that is, on average, of 
higher quality. 
 
The information in Figs. 3 – 4 can be used to evaluate a given scenario’s efficacy in 
providing habitat for species with a range of grassland habitat requirements. If the sole 
objective was to maximise the amount of grassland over the next 20 years, then in some 
situations private conservation outperformed public for both large and small budgets 
(Fig. 3a, 3c). If the objective was to maximise the amount of high quality grassland in 
80 years time, then there were situations were public conservation was the preferable 
method under small and medium budgets (Figs. 3b, S3) and also the preferable method 
under the large budget if a longer time horizon was considered (Fig. 3d). In ecological 
terms, if a species of concern could utilise grassland in a range of degraded conditions, 
then the private conservation strategy could provide more habitat for that species 
provided development was minimal and management costs were not large. However, if 
a species required grassland in high condition then public conservation provided a 
greater amount of secure habitat. For some objectives, the mixed strategy could be 
preferable, since at the end of the simulation the mixed strategy often had only a slightly 
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lower score than public conservation but had a significantly higher score earlier in the 
simulation (e.g. Figs. 3d, 4d).  
  
With high enough rates of development, it would always be preferable to have at 
least some component of public conservation, due to its protective effect. Where large 
amounts of habitat are vulnerable to loss due to the limited protection of private 
conservation contracts, development pressure causes the private conservation policy to 
end up with the same low summed condition score as the Do nothing scenario (Fig. 4). 
 
4.2 Purchase and management costs 
Purchase and management costs were an important factor in driving policy 
performance.  In real peri-urban situations, parcel purchase costs per hectare can vary 
considerably due to many context-specific factors. We incorporated this variation into 
the model by stochastically determining parcel purchase prices in a way that is 
consistent with the distribution of real parcel sales data from the study area (see 
Supplementary information). A significant portion of the variation in policy 
performance between model realisations was due to this stochastic assignment of costs. 
This variation is useful for assessing how a policy’s performance might change if 
applied to other urban-fringe locations with similar vegetation, where the purchase costs 
had comparable distributions.  
 
Varying the management costs had a significant impact on all policies. High 
management costs (Fig. 5) changed the ranking of policies when using TSC to evaluate 
performance (Fig. 5a, 5c). This demonstrates that model outcomes can be sensitive to 
management costs and that a case study using vegetation with different management 
costs could significantly alter predicted and real policy performance. 
 
Finally, management costs were assumed to be the same for both public and private 
land.  While this may be approximately true, several factors could cause management 
costs to vary. On public land, management costs will be sensitive to reserve aggregation 
due to the increased resources required for a single agency to manage many small, 
dispersed parcels. Similarly, the management cost for private conservation contracts 
offered by landholders via auction might vary due to landholder competition and 
differing implementation and opportunity costs. These factors could be incorporated to 
investigate their effect on policy performance, though it would incur a considerable 
increase in model complexity. 
 
4.3 Assumptions and generalization 
In this study, parcels chosen for private conservation were selected randomly, which 
may be realistic if an agency’s primary goal is to educate and include as many 
landholders as possible.  In reality, while the landholders interested in private 
conservation could be (effectively) random, the subset of landholders selected for a 
given program may not be. Victoria’s BushTender program (Stoneham et al., 2003; 
DSE, 2008a) uses a strategic cost-benefit approach in selecting a subset of landholders 
to be awarded conservation contracts. This strategy attempts to maximise participation 
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(and total area) in the program, while also prioritising parcels containing a number of 
attributes including higher quality vegetation and security, the presence of threatened 
species and proximity to existing public reserves and private land conservation. This 
approach, where anyone in the study area has an opportunity to participate and a final 
selection is made with predefined criteria, deals with issues such as equity and 
incomplete information, where the agency may not initially know where the greatest 
benefits lie. Incorporating these refinements would add considerable complexity to the 
parcel selection procedure for private conservation and could lead to improved private 
performance, but we have not tested this here.  
 
It is also likely that there would be some proportion of landholders who would never 
be interested in participating in private conservation contracts.  Depending on the 
conservation value of their land, this could potentially degrade the performance of 
private conservation.  Analogously, there may be cases where landholders are unwilling 
to sell land to an agency for public conservation. If governments are unwilling to risk 
the social impacts of compulsory acquisition mechanisms, this could reduce the ability 
of an agency to strategically purchase land for public conservation and thereby reduce 
the performance of public conservation. 
 
This does suggest that repeatedly targeting the same landholders would improve the 
performance of private conservation, allowing it to mimic the acquisition and condition 
maintenance benefits of the public approach. The question then becomes, how much 
payment is required to make this worthwhile for the landholder?  We have not 
investigated this question here, as it may also be vulnerable to the temporal uncertainties 
discussed below in section 4.4. Victoria’s BushTender program deals with this issue by 
offering landholders the opportunity to choose a "permanent on-title agreement" as part 
of their contract. Data from BushTender trials indicates that approximately 20% of 
offered contracts are permanent (DSE, 2006). Incorporating this fact into our model 
would improve the performance of private conservation, provided that a permanent 
contract is assumed to entail permanent management. 
 
The management costs of fragmented habitats have been touched on above, and it is 
commonly assumed that only a public model of conservation allows the strategic 
management of connected areas. However, given the desirability of habitat connectivity 
for many threatened species, it is possible that aggregation in private land conservation 
could also be encouraged by systematically-designed payment schemes which favour 
particular spatial structures (e.g., Hartig et al. (2009)). Such an approach could 
theoretically increase biodiversity value for the same expenditure on management 
contracts. To incorporate measures such as these in our simulations would probably 
entail an extension to agent-based models, with the associated problems of validation 
and model tractability. However, it is a possible direction for future research.   
 
 Finally, the grassland condition change model is an important driver of model 
outcomes. In these experiments we have used three different curves to represent the 
change in condition over time derived from expert opinion.  The slope of each curve 
determines how rapidly condition change occurs as parcels are managed or unmanaged.  
The condition change interacts with both the length of contract and the frequency of 
contracts that revisit the same site.  The threshold behaviour also affects outcomes 
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because if there was no lower threshold, then every piece of land would be worth 
investing in, and the low quality parcels would offer the biggest gain per dollar spent.  
An even bigger change in policy performance might be likely if unmanaged vegetation 
did not degrade, though this is not realistic for the peri-urban grasslands in this study.  
When considering other ecosystem types that are less prone to degradation if left 
unmanaged, protection rather than management may be found to be the primary driver 
of total landscape condition. 
 
4.4 Robustness to uncertainties 
The sensitivity of the models and policies to underlying assumptions raises the issue 
of uncertainties and robustness in general, especially relating to temporal uncertainties. 
Here we incorporated development as one particular type of adversity and discussed the 
robustness of policies to this process. Most policies and objectives do not explicitly 
include a goal of robustness with respect to uncertainty.  Yet, some form of adversity 
and even catastrophe are nearly guaranteed during the course of a policy enacted over 
many years, as the last 30 years of boom and bust economics demonstrates.  
 
Consider the consequences for policies based entirely on private land management 
that are limited to parcels where landholders choose to participate. These policies are 
subject to the political whims of changing governments and as such, provide no 
guaranteed long-term security for funding contracts. This lack of robustness to 
uncertainty may counter some of the initial attractiveness of private conservation.  
However, the alternative policies, based on the consolidation of conservation into a 
smaller set of public lands, may leave reserves more subject to environmental 
catastrophes and will still require ongoing government funds for management. These 
types of arguments could be used for advocating a mixed policy of public and private 
conservation. Future modelling work will include additional types of adversity to 
determine whether the best policy under stationary conditions is still the best policy 
under volatile conditions. 
 
5 Conclusions  
Many governments are increasingly supplementing public ownership and 
management of conservation resources with market-based conservation policies enacted 
on private land.  This raises a number of questions such as: Do conservation outcomes 
improve if conservation is done privately rather than publicly?  Is there value in splitting 
resources between the two approaches instead of committing exclusively to one or the 
other?  If so, how should they be split?  We have demonstrated a modelling approach 
for evaluating conservation policy outcomes and compared the performance of three 
different policies.  No one policy was always best, and performance depended on the 
scenario being tested and the objectives of those enacting the policy.  This highlights the 
utility of a model that incorporates both the ecological and the socioeconomic process in 
order to explore the efficacy of conservation policies in specific real-world situations.  
Importantly, these kinds of models could also help to assess policy robustness with 
respect to unforeseen adversity and catastrophes in the future. 
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Figures  
 
 
Fig. 1: The study area to the west of Melbourne, Australia. The black lines show land 
parcels in the study area and grassland condition is shown with graduated grey scale 
where a darker colour represents higher condition. The cross-hatched areas show the 
locations within which parcels less than 5 hectares occur. A high-resolution version of 
this figure is available in the Supplementary information (Fig. S6). 
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Fig. 2: Curves used to parameterise the grassland condition model and predict condition 
change over time for managed (solid lines) and unmanaged (dashed line) native 
grassland. Condition is measured in rescaled habitat hectares (see text). The solid black 
line depicts the condition change for vegetation already below the 0.35 threshold value. 
The solid grey line depicts the condition change for vegetation whose condition is above 
the 0.35 threshold value. 
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Fig. 3: Comparison of the four conservation policies with budgets of $1M and $2M per 
time-step, no development and low management costs. Plots in the left column show the 
total summed condition (TSC) as a function of time, while the plots in the right column 
show the summed condition above the condition threshold (CAT) (see text). The grey 
bands show the performance range and the line in the middle of each band shows the 
median performance over 5 realisations. 
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Fig. 4: Comparison of the four conservation policies with budgets of $1M and $2M per 
time-step with development occurring and low management costs. The arrangement of 
the plots is identical to Fig. 3. 
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Fig. 5: Comparison of the four conservation policies with budgets of $1M and $2M per 
time-step using high management cost and no development. The arrangement of the 
plots is identical to Fig 3. 
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Appendix A: Supplementary information 
 
 
Background information on Western (Basalt) Plains Natural Temperate Grassland 
 
Native grasslands across temperate south eastern Australia have been modified 
structurally and have declined in species richness as a consequence of the interplay 
between a range of historic and ongoing processes including cultivation, intensive stock 
grazing, rabbit grazing, the addition of fertilisers and exotic plant introductions and 
invasions (McDougall and Kirkpatrick, 1993; Dorrough et al., 2004).  Prior to European 
settlement these grasslands were regularly burnt by aboriginal people (Gott, 1994) and 
were subject to grazing by marsupials such as kangaroos.  Contemporary native 
grassland remnants are in a range of conditions and contexts as a consequence of site-
specific idiosyncrasies and their recent history (Lunt, 1997).  
 
There have been measurable declines in the species diversity and condition of native 
grasslands that result from a range of factors. These include i) exotic plant invasion, 
particularly invasions mediated by perennial grasses (McLaren et al., 1998; Morgan 
1998), ii) the absence of regular fire, grazing or drought which can result in acute 
interspecific competition exerted by the dominant tussock grass (Lunt and Morgan, 
1999; Williams et al., 2006), iii) high grazing intensities and phosphate fertiliser 
application (Dorrough and Scroggie 2008, McIntyre and Lavorel 1994). 
 
 
Determining land parcel purchase cost 
 
Sale price data for the study was taken from a confidentialised extract of unit-record 
property sale valuations from the 2008 Victoria Valuer General Statewide Valuations 
Dataset. Property sales prices were selected if they had a rural land use categorisation, 
were in a municipality that overlapped or adjoined the study area and had been sold 
after 1990. All prices had been inflated from their nominal value to 2008 dollars.  
 
As larger parcels tend to have a lower price per hectare, we split the sale prices into two 
samples based on whether the parcel had an area less than or greater than 150 hectares. 
Due to the small number of large parcels sold, there was not enough data for a finer 
scale binning based on parcel area. A lognormal function was then fitted to the 
distributions of prices per hectare to obtain two continuous functions from which to 
sample price data (Fig. S1). 
 
At the start of each simulation every parcel was assigned a purchase price in the 
following manner. A price per hectare was determined by sampling from the 
appropriate lognormal distribution (Fig. S2) depending on whether the parcel had an 
area less than or greater than 150 hectares. The total price of the parcel was then 
determined by multiplying this price by the area of the parcel.  
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Fig. S1. The results from fitting a lognormal distribution to the property price data. Two 
separate fits were made for properties less than 150 ha (n = 688) and greater than 150 ha (n = 
58).  
 
Fig. S2. The lognormal distributions used in determining parcel costs per hectare. The solid and 
dashed distributions were used for parcels with areas greater or less than 150 hectares, 
respectively. The total cost of a parcel was then obtained by multiplying the parcel cost per 
hectare by the area of the parcel.  
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Further details on the grassland content of parcels 
 
Parcels with an area less than 5 hectares were excluded from the study, as these parcels 
were primarily residential and contain a small amount of lower quality grassland. These 
smaller parcels also tend to be aggregated into clusters that occur around the edges of 
the areas of higher quality grassland (Fig. S6). Table S1 gives further information 
regarding the grassland content of parcels above and below five hectares in size.   
 
The parcels greater than 5 hectares cover 68% of the study area and contain 93% of the 
grassland in the study area. The grassland in parcels with an area less than five hectares 
tends to be in a lower condition with a median condition score of 0.36 versus a median 
of 0.45 for parcels greater than 5 hectares. Another aggregate measure of the condition 
is the proportion of grassland above the condition threshold. This measures the amount 
of the grassland that has the potential to be restored to a high condition (see Section 2.5 
in the manuscript). Using this measure, 54% of the grassland in parcels less than five 
hectares is above the condition threshold compared to 71% for the parcels greater than 
five hectares. This means that only 5% of the higher-quality grassland in the study area 
is to be found on the parcels below 5 hectares in area. 
 
Table S1. Further details on the grassland content of the parcels above and below 5 hectares in 
size. 
 
 All parcels > 5 ha All parcels ≤5 ha 
Proportion of study area 0.684 0.316 
Proportion of all grassland in 
study area 
0.933 0.067 
Median condition of grassland 0.450 0.364 
Proportion of grassland above 
the condition threshold 
0.710 0.535 
Proportion of all grassland in 
study are above condition 
threshold 
0.949 0.051 
 
Note: condition is measured in rescaled habitat hectares (see Section 2.2 in the manuscript). 
 
 
 
 
Results including $1.5M budget 
 
Figs. S3 – S5 show the same plots as Figs. 3 – 5 in the manuscript with additional 
results for the intermediate budget of $1.5M. As expected, the $1.5M budget results are 
consistent with a transition between the results for the $1M and $2M budgets.  
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Fig. S3: Comparison of the four conservation policies with budgets of $1M, $1.5M and $2M per 
time step with no development and low management costs. Plots in the left column show the 
total summed condition as a function of time, while the plots in the right column show the 
summed condition above the condition threshold (see text).  On each graph, all policies were 
run 5 times to depict the effects of model stochasticity. The grey bands show the performance 
range and the line in the middle of each band shows the median value over the 5 realisations.   
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Fig. S4: Comparison of the four conservation policies with budgets of $1M, $1.5M and $2M per 
time step with development occurring and low management costs.  The arrangement of the plots 
is identical to Fig. S3. 
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Fig. S5: Comparison of the four conservation policies with budgets of $1M, $1.5M and $2M per 
time step using the high management cost and no development.  The arrangement of the plots is 
identical to Fig S3. 
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Fig. S6: The study area to the west of Melbourne, Australia. This is a higher resolution version 
of Fig. 1 in the manuscript. The black lines show land parcels in the study area and grassland 
condition is shown with graduated grey scale where a darker colour represents higher 
condition. The cross-hatched areas show the locations within which parcels less than 5 
hectares occur. 
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